An Experimental Investigation of the Disparity between WTA and WTP for Lotteries by Traub, Stefan & Schmidt, Ulrich
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Traub, Stefan; Schmidt, Ulrich
Working Paper
An Experimental Investigation of the
Disparity between WTA and WTP for
Lotteries
Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics,
No. 2006,09
Provided in cooperation with:
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel (CAU)
Suggested citation: Traub, Stefan; Schmidt, Ulrich (2006) : An Experimental Investigation of the
Disparity between WTA and WTP for Lotteries, Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-
Universität Kiel, Department of Economics, No. 2006,09, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22014An Experimental Investigation of the Disparity 
between WTA and WTP for Lotteries
by Ulrich Schmidt and Stefan Traub
Economics Working Paper
No 2006-09An Experimental Investigation of









Abstract: In this paper we experimentally investigate the disparity between willingness-to-
accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for risky lotteries. The direction of the in-
come effect is reversed by endowing subjects with the highest price of a lottery when ask-
ing the WTP question. Our results show that the income effect is too small to be the only 
source of the disparity. Since the disparity concentrates on a subsample of subjects, para-
metric and nonparametric tests of the WTA-WTP ratio may lead to contradictory results. 
The disparity is significantly reduced when background risk is introduced. That is, putting 
subjects always into a risky position could improve the contingent valuation method which 
is often concerned with the assessment of risky situations such as health risks, automobile 
safety, etc. 
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11 Introduction
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a prominent tool for cost-benefit analysis, the 
assessment of public goods, and environmental policy. For critical surveys see the volumes 
edited by Cummings et al. (1986) and Bateman and Munro (1999), in particular the chapter 
by Sugden (1999) in the latter book. CVM studies usually consider two different questions 
in order to assess a respondent’s valuation of a given good or service: (i) the maximum 
buying   price   or   willingness-to-pay   (WTP)   and   (ii)   the   minimum   selling   price   or 
willingness-to-accept (WTA). In an important contribution Willig (1976) showed that it 
ought to be irrelevant whether one chooses the WTA or the WTP question, provided 
income effects are sufficiently small. However, not only CVM studies but also numerous 
experimental studies found a disparity between both measures seemingly too large to be 
explained by income effects alone. Hence, psychological explanations like the endowment 
effect (Thaler, 1980), that is, the underweighting of opportunity relative to out-of-pocket 
costs due to loss aversion, have been put forward to resolve these observations (see Traub, 
1999, for a survey of experimental studies). 
By many authors the disparity between WTA and WTP has been considered as an 
empirically   proven   fact   that   does   not   even   vanish   in   non-hypothetical,   market-like 
environments. Indeed, for example, Shogren et al. (1994, 2001) showed that using repeated 
auction mechanisms reduces the disparity. Likewise, Harless (1989) concluded from his 
experiment that, in the context of risk, the “difference between the measures of value 
decreases significantly” (p. 359) when both are elicited by means of an incentive-compatible 
preference-revelation mechanism, namely second-price sealed-bid auctions. However, their 
results may be attributed to shaping. That is, subjects’ responses are adjusted in response to 
cues provided by the market mechanism rather than that subjects learn to act on their true 
preferences (Loomes et al., 2003).
In the context of riskless choice, Morrison (1997) found that the disparity remained 
significant even if the subjects were endowed with the average WTA stated by all subjects 
when asking the WTP question. She concluded from that, that the disparity was due to an 
endowment effect rather than an income or substitution effect since subjects stayed on the 
same indifference curves when asking for both measures of value. Bateman et al. (1997) 
too controlled for income and substitution effects
1 and reasoned from the results of their 
study that “it seems that the influence of loss aversion is a robust effect” (p. 503). As for 
other commodities, also for risky lotteries a substantial disparity between WTP and WTA has 
1 These authors assessed WTA and WTP both as equivalent and compensating measure of value.
2been observed in many empirical studies (see the literature overview in Eisenberger and 
Weber, 1995). However, as far as we know, none of these studies controlled for income 
effects. Here lies one of the main motivations of the present paper. We will have a look at the 
role of the income effect more closely than it has been done before. More precisely, we will 
reverse the income effect as compared to earlier studies, that is, in our experiment subjects 
will have a higher wealth position when asked for WTP. 
The assessment of WTA and WTP for lotteries differs from riskless commodities: 
while an individual is always in a safe position in the case of riskless commodities there is an 
asymmetry for lotteries (asymmetric certainty effect). When determining WTP the individual 
has to give up a certain wealth position and achieves a risky position; in contrast, the individu-
al exchanges a risky for a certain position when determining WTA. Since this asymmetry 
may have an influence on the disparity we will eliminate it by introducing background risk. A 
possible alternative to WTA and WTP in CVM studies is the assessment of cash equivalents 
(CE) called certainty equivalents in the context of risk. Since the income position in the elicit-
ation of CE and WTA is identical, their comparison excludes income effects completely. 
Therefore, we have also elicited CE in our experiment in order to compare with WTA.  
The relevance of the WTA-WTP disparity for cost-benefit analysis as well as for the 
understanding of markets and individual decision making has been emphasized by a number 
of authors (Borges and Knetsch, 1998; Kahneman et al., 1990, 1991; Knetsch, 1989, 1990, 
1992, 1995, 2000; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984, 1987).
2 In fact, many typical CVM situations 
such as the assessment of road and automobile safety and accident risks (see Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988; McDaniels, 1992; and Duborg et al., 1994), reliability of power supply 
(see Hartman et al., 1990, 1991), and health risks (Shogren et al., 1994) involve risk or uncer-
tainty. Due to the disparity it is natural to ask for the best CVM measure in the context of risk. 
Under certainty, it has been argued that WTP is the better measure since WTA usually de-
creases with market experience while WTP remains constant (see Coursey et al., 1987). 
However, if preferences are shaped by the mechanism with which they are assessed as sug-
gested by the experiments of Loomes et al. (2003), then also the WTP measure is biased (up-
wards). On the other hand, if substantial income effects exist, WTP is obviously too small in 
order to compensate people for the loss of a good. Consequently, it is an important question 
whether income effects cause the disparity between WTP and WTA. If income effects play 
only a minor role, the disparity may be due to the asymmetric certainty effect. In that case 
CVM studies could be improved by introducing background risk in the elicitation of WTP 
2 Yet, opinions differ widely about the relevance of the phenomenon: “As a matter of practical importance in 
markets it [the endowment effect] is perhaps of little concern” (Franciosi et al. 1996, p. 226).
3and WTA. It may also turn out that CE is more suitable than WTP or WTA for CVM studies 
involving risk or uncertainty. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce some notation and 
define our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experiment. In Section 4, we present the 
results of our experiment. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Hypotheses
2.1 Income Effects
Consider an individual taking an initial wealth position of Y who is offered to purchase a 
lottery L. According to expected utility (EU) and all alternative utility theories which are 
based on final wealth positions, the individual‘s WTP for purchasing the lottery is given by
(1) ) ) ( ( ) ( L L WTP Y V Y V + - = .
Analogously, assuming that the individual already owns the lottery, his WTA for selling 
the lottery is given by 
(2) )) ( ( ) ( L WTA Y V L Y V + = + .
Obviously, in (2) the individual is in a higher wealth position than in (1). Thus, if the 
degree of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing we get
(3) ) ( ) ( L WTP L WTA ³ ,
and the disparity, if any, is solely due to a (small) income effect.
More often than not, in the empirical and experimental literature, the case 
WTP WTA >  has been interpreted as a fundamental failure of standard utility theory rather 
than in terms of an income effect. In order to be on the safe side with this assertion, 
however, one has to control for the influence of the income effect.
3
Let  y  denote the highest possible payoff of lottery  L. Now, assume that the 
individual’s initial wealth position is augmented by that amount before buying the lottery. 
Then, his WTP for purchasing the lottery is given by
(4) ) ) ( ( ) ( L L WTP y Y V y Y V + - + = +
3 As noted in the Introduction, in the context of riskless choice, Morrison (1997) endowed subjects with the 
average WTA when asking for the WTP. Since, on average, subjects exhibited the same level of utility, ob-
served disparities could not be due to income or substitution effects. Bateman et al. (1997) assessed the im-
plicit rankings of two riskless consumption bundles from four different reference points, thus, controlling for 
all substitution and income effects, in order to test on loss aversion.
4instead of (1). It is evident that under (4) the individual takes a higher wealth position than 
under (2) since she or he is endowed with the highest possible payoff of L and not with the 
lottery itself. Hence, the income effect ought to work into the opposite direction, that is,
(5) ) ( ) ( L WTP L WTA < .
If subjects receive y before eliciting WTP there are, apart from the income effect, 
three further effects which could potentially increase WTP as compared to WTA. Since y 
is given by the highest possible prize of the lottery the payment of y can make this prize 
more salient. Hence, WTP may be biased upwards: (i) by an anchoring effect, that is, y 
serves as the starting point and its downward adjustments is insufficient (see Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974); (ii) by a compatibility effect, that is, the fact that  y  has the same 
dimension as the response scale causes an overweighting of the highest possible prize (see 
Tversky et al. 1988); and (iii) y could be regarded as “house money” which leads to a 
lower degree of risk aversion and, thus, to a higher WTP (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
However, all these effects work in the same direction as the income effect. If it was the 
income effect which caused the WTA-WTP disparity in earlier studies, WTP should 
definitely exceed WTA in our setup. Hence, equation (5) forms the basis of the null 
hypothesis of our first test:







Since the income effect could have a negligible effect on WTP, we will treat the 
case   ) ( ) ( L WTP L WTA =   not   as   violations   of   the   null   hypothesis.   When   using 
nonparametric tests, observations of this type will be regarded as „ties“ and distributed 
evenly among the „less than one“ and „more than one“ categories. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected and WTA still exceeds WTP significantly, the conclusion may be drawn that the 
income effect cannot be the only source of the disparity. Note that we test ratios rather than 
differences in most cases as we used a within-subjects comparison design (see Harless, 
1989).
2.2 Background Risk
From Kahneman and Tversky´s (1979) certainty effect it is well-known that integrating safe 
options in decision making under risk can cause deviations from rational behaviour. In fact, 
experimentally observed violations of  EU seem to be most pronounced when degenerate lot-
5teries are contained in the choice set. This evidence has motivated the development of theor-
ies which are equivalent to EU if all alternatives are risky but allow for deviations from EU in 
the presence of riskless options (see Fishburn, 1980 and Bleichrodt and Schmidt, 2002). Also 
in the elicitation of WTA and WTP certainty is involved: when determining WTP, the indi-
vidual has to give up a certain wealth position and achieves a risky position; in contrast, the 
individual exchanges a risky for a certain position when determining WTA. Hence, it may be 
possible that an asymmetric effect of the certain positions causes the disparity between WTP 
and WTA.
This effect can be controlled by letting subjects always start from and end up in a 
risky position. More specifically, we consider two lotteries, B and W, and an individual 
who strictly prefers B over W. The individual is endowed with the worse lottery and asked 
for his WTP for exchanging the worse lottery W for the better lottery B, hereafter called 
differential willingness-to-pay (DWTP). Additionally, we endow subjects as before with y, 
the highest possible payoff of the worse lottery, in order to reverse the income effect. This 
results in the following definition of DWTP:
(7) ) ( )) , ( ( W y Y V B W DWTP B y Y V + + = - + + .
Analogously, the subject may be endowed with the better lottery and asked for his 
differential willingness-to-accept (DWTA) in order to exchange the better lottery for the 
worse lottery. DWTA is given by
(8) )) , ( ( ) ( W B DWTA W Y V B Y V + + = + .
Again, under (7) the subject’s utility is greater than under (8). Accordingly, we 
should have
(9) ) , ( ) , ( W B DWTA B W DWTP > ,
which forms the null hypothesis of our second test:







where “ties” are again distributed evenly among the “less than one” and “more than one” 
categories.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, the conclusion that it cannot be the income effect 
alone which causes the disparity between WTA and WTP applies in the presence of 
background risk as well. Note that the payment of y in the case of DWTP may not only 
6cause an income effect but also the compatibility, anchoring, and house money effects 
mentioned above, which tend to bias DWTP upwards. Otherwise, if the test generates 
different results than the first test presented in equation (6), we can draw the conclusion 
that background risk must have an impact on the disparity.
 Suppose that EU holds and income effects are negligible as in the case of constant 






=  = 1,
and background risk does not play any role for the relation of WTP and WTA. Of course, 
if WTA / WTP ¹ 1, we may have DWTA / DWTP ¹ WTA / WTP even in the case of EU. 
Nevertheless, if both fractions differ very much, we may draw some further conclusions on 











H ¹ = : . : 1 0 .
2.3 Cash Equivalents
The cash equivalent (CE) or certainty equivalent of a lottery L is given by that amount of 
money which makes an individual indifferent between receiving this amount or receiving the 
lottery. Formally, we have
(13) ) ( )) ( ( L Y V L CE Y V + = + .
Using (2) yields
(14) )) ( ( )) ( ( L WTA Y V L CE Y V + = + .
Thus, if WTA and CE are elicited in an incentive compatible way, both measures should be 
identical for a given lottery. In order to analyse this question the hypothesis of our fourth test 
is given by







In the presence of reference dependent preferences the framing with respect to gains 
and losses matters. According to Kahneman et al. (1990) individuals compare a potential gain 
of a lottery with a potential gain of money under CE while they compare a potential loss of a 
lottery with a potential gain of money under WTA. In the case of loss aversion the potential 
7loss of the lottery under WTA should weigh more heavily then the potential gain under CE 
which would yield WTA>CE. Since the null hypothesis of our tests is always EU, we decided 
to choose a two-tailed test. If the null hypothesis is rejected, there are systematic differences 
between CE and WTA and it may turn out that, due to the avoidance of loss frames, CE is a 
more suitable tool in CVM studies than WTA.
3 The Experiment
The experiment was conducted at the Centre of Experimental Economics (EXEC) at the 
University of York with 24 subjects. Subjects were approached by the e-mail list of EXEC 
which contains mostly economics students interested in the participation in experiments. Each 
subject had to attend five separate treatments within one week, one per day. During five days 
of this week one of each five different treatments was offered on every single day with 
varying chronological order. The participants could choose on which day they attended which 
treatment. Since at most six students were allowed in one session the order in which 
treatments were completed varied sufficiently between participants.   
Treatments lasted between 25 and 40 minutes. Expenditure of time varied not only 
between treatments but also across subjects since the subjects were explicitly encouraged to 
proceed at their own pace. After a subject had completed all five treatments, one question of 
one treatment was selected randomly and played out for real. The average payment to the 
subjects was £34.17 with £80 being the highest and £0 being the lowest payment.
Insert Table 1 about here 
At each of the five treatments subjects were presented with the same 30 lottery pairs 
(see Table 1), 28 of which were risky. The remaining two (“uncertain”) pairs of lotteries were 
expressed as in the Ellsberg Paradox with £30 as possible prize. In each pair, the left lottery 
was safer than the right lottery. Lotteries were presented as cake diagrams on the computer 
screen. Figure 1 presents an example of a lottery involving a 50% chance of winning £10, a 
20% chance of winning £30, and a 30% chance of winning £40. If a subject received a 
particular lottery as reward, he or she had to spin a wheel of fortune using the corresponding 
cake diagram in order to determine the prize.
Insert Figure 1 about here 
We turn to the explanation of the single treatments now. Although the subjects 
completed the treatments in a varying order, we number them consecutively for reasons of 
8exposition. At the first treatment, the WTP for all 60 lotteries was elicited in an incentive-
compatible way. The lotteries appeared separately in randomised order on the computer 
screen and the subjects were asked for each lottery:
Submit your bid for this lottery in a second-price sealed-bid auction.
This means that subjects were asked to assume they did not have the lotteries and had to bid 
in order to get them.  The subjects had to type in their bids and to confirm their answers by 
pressing the return key. At the beginning of the treatment, each subject received a three-page 
instruction   sheet.   Then   an   audio-tape   of   these   instructions   was   played   which   took 
approximately   10   minutes.   The   instructions   explained   the   rules   and   the   incentive 
compatibility of second-price sealed-bid auctions in detail. As an example the instructions for 
treatment 1 can be found in the Appendix. The instructions to the other treatments were 
similar and can be obtained from the authors upon request. If a question of treatment 1 was 
selected for reward, the subject received a payment of £y where y is the highest possible prize 
of the corresponding lottery. Moreover, if the subject submitted the highest bid among all 
subjects in the group with whom he or she completed the treatment, he or she would 
additionally play out the lottery and would have to pay the second highest bid. Thus, in 
treatment 1 we elicited  ) (L WTP  as defined by equation (4).
4
Treatment 2 was identical to treatment 1 except for the fact that a different question 
was asked:
Submit your offer for this lottery in a second-price offer auction.
Analogously, this means that the subjects were asked to assume that they owned the lottery 
and had to make an offer to dispose of it. Again, subjects received handouts and had to listen 
to an audio-tape which explained the rules and the incentive compatibility of the second-price 
offer auction. If a question from this treatment was selected for reward, the subject could 
either play out the corresponding lottery, or - if he or she submitted the lowest offer among all 
subjects in the group with whom he or she completed the treatment - he or she received the 
second lowest offer instead of the lottery. Thus, in treatment 2, we elicited WTA(L) as defined 
by equation (2) for each lottery in an incentive-compatible way.
4 We are aware of the fact that, in general, second-price auctions are only incentive compatible if the inde-
pendence axiom of expected utility (EU) holds (see Grimm and Schmidt, 2000, for details; see also Harless, 
1989). This is unproblematic here, since EU is included in the null hypothesis. 
9Treatment 3 was designed to assess the certainty equivalents of the lotteries. The 30 
lottery pairs were presented in random order and random left-right positioning. Under the left 
(right) lottery of the pair the following question appeared:
State the amount of money such that you do not care whether you will receive this 
amount or the left (right) lottery.
For both lotteries subjects had to type in the corresponding amount and confirm their answers 
by pressing the return key. Incentive-compatibility was ensured by the standard BDM 
mechanism. If the question under one of the lotteries was chosen as reward, a number z was 
randomly drawn between 0 and y where y is the highest possible prize in the given lottery. If 
z was greater or equal to the answer, the subject received £z, otherwise she or he could play 
out the given lottery. In this treatment we therefore elicited CE(L) as defined by equation (13) 
in a standard way which can be compared with the WTA and WTP measures.
In treatments 4 and 5 we elicited subjects’ DWTA and DWTP. In treatment 4 both 
lotteries of each pair appeared as cake diagrams on the screen and the subjects were randomly 
endowed with either the left or the right lottery. The order of the lottery pairs and the left-right 
positioning of each lottery pair was randomised too. Above the lottery serving as initial 
endowment the message “Your endowment” appeared in bright colour. Suppose that the initial 
endowment was given by the left (right) lottery. Then, the following two questions appeared 
under the lottery:
How much are you at most willing to pay in order to receive the right (left) lottery 
instead of the left (right) one?
How much has at least to be paid to you in order that you agree to exchange the left 
(right) lottery for the right (left) one?
Subjects had to answer both questions by typing in the corresponding amount and confirming 
it by pressing the return key. Negative amounts were not permitted. Incentive-compatibility 
was ensured by the following variant of the BDM mechanism. If the first question was 
selected for the reward, the subject received a fixed payment of £y where y is the highest 
possible prize in the given lottery. Moreover, a number z was randomly drawn between 0 and 
y. If z was higher than the answer to the first question the individual could additionally play 
out the left (right) lottery. If  z  was less than or equal to the answer, the subject could 
additionally play out the right (left) lottery and had to pay £z. If the second question was 
selected for the reward again a number z was randomly drawn as explained above. If z was 
less than the answer to the second question, the subject could play out the left (right) lottery. 
10If z was greater than or equal to the answer, the subject could play out the right (left) lottery 
and additionally received £z.
At the beginning of treatments 4 and 5, subjects received a four-page instruction sheet 
and, again, an audio-tape of these instructions was played which took approximately fifteen 
minutes. The instructions explained the rules and the incentive compatibility of our BDM 
variant by analysing several examples. 
Treatment 5 was completely identical to treatment 4 apart from the fact that the initial 
endowment was reversed, that is, if the initial endowment was the safe (risky) lottery in 
treatment 4, it was the risky (safe) lottery in treatment 5. The left-right positioning of the 
lotteries was again randomised and independent of that in treatment 4. By means of 
treatments 4 and 5 we have obviously elicited DWTA(B,W) and DWTP(W,B) as defined by 
equations (10) and (11). Note that in both, treatment 4 and treatment 5, at least one answer for 
a given lottery pair should be zero. More precisely, if the individual is endowed with the 
better (worse) lottery, the answer to the DWTP (DWTA) question should be zero. This was 
also explained in the instructions. Suppose the answer to the DWTP (DWTA) question in 
treatment 4 was positive. This implies that in treatment 5 the answer to the DWTA (DWTP) 
question should be positive. Consequently, when analysing the DWTA-DWTP ratio later in 
this paper, we only considered those cases in which the DWTP was positive in treatment 4 (5) 
and the DWTA positive in treatment 5 (4).
4 Results
4.1 Income Effects
On the left of Table 2 the results from testing on the WTA-WTP disparity (equation (6)) 
are given. The table lists for each lottery, except for lotteries 1 and 5, the number of valid 
observations, the mean (first row) and standard error (second row) of the WTA—WTP ra-
tio, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z statistic, the median (first row) of the WTA—WTP ratio, 
and the number of observations k for which the ratio was greater than one including half of 
the ties, where the total number of ties is given in parentheses (second row). Lotteries 1 
and 5 were excluded since they are degenerated one-outcome lotteries (30 pounds and 10 
pounds, respectively). If the number of valid observations listed in the table is less than 24, 
this may be due to one of the following reasons: either stated WTA or WTP was larger 
11than the highest or smaller than the lowest possible prize of a lottery, or WTP was equal to 
zero. According to these criteria one subject was completely excluded from the sample.
5
Insert Table 2 about here 
In the third column of the table, one leading asterisk marks a mean if it was signi-
ficantly greater than 1 at the 10% level (one-tailed t test). Analogously, two leading aster-
isks mean that the null hypothesis had to be rejected at the 5% level. As can be taken from 
the table, in 50 of 58 cases the null hypothesis of the WTA-WTP ratio being smaller than 
one was rejected at the 5% significance level (55 at the 10% level). The probability that 
this observation is due to pure chance is extremely low ( 01 . ) 50 ( < ³ k P , binomial test 
with parameters  05 . and 58 = = q n ). Thus, standard t tests indicate that - despite the re-
versed income effect - the WTA-WTP disparity is replicated for our setup. The median of 
the mean disparities of the single lotteries was 1.876. Taken alone, this evidence would 
mean that the income effect alone cannot be the main cause of the disparity.
However, the picture looks different when taking into account that the distribution 
of the WTA-WTP ratios was highly skewed in most cases. Performing a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test showed that we had to reject the null hypothesis of the distribution of the 
WTA-WTP ratios being normal in 40 cases (see column 4 of the table). Therefore, we ad-
ditionally performed sign tests on the median of the WTA-WTP ratios (column 5). Now, 
we could reject the null hypothesis of the median being smaller than one only in 5 cases (
05 . £ p ) and 13 cases ( 10 . £ p ), respectively. A binomial test does not reject that this pat-
tern   is   due   to   pure   chance   ( 164 . ) 5 ( = ³ k P ,   binomial   test   with   parameters 
05 . and 58 = = q n ).
6 Thus, in contrast to the t tests nonparametric tests do not confirm a 
positive WTA-WTP disparity for most lotteries. The overall median is close to unity 
(1.058).
It is interesting to see that always about half of the subjects exhibited a positive dis-
parity, causing a mean ratio significantly larger than one. It is self suggesting to check 
whether these subjects were always the same across the different lotteries. We therefore 
counted the number of positive disparities (ratios of WTA and WTP larger than one) for 
5 Subjects were only excluded from the analysis of the task where they violated dominance and included in 
the analysis of all other hypotheses. This may be problematic since we cannot rule out the possibility that 
subjects violated dominance because they misunderstood the instructions rather than committing simple er-
rors.
6 Note, however, that the null hypothesis is rejected for the more generous significance level of 10% (
01 . ) 13 ( < ³ k P , binomial test with parameters  10 . and 58 = = q n ).
12every subject. We used a standard binomial test, where it was assumed that the up to 58 
observations for every subjects were independent from one another and that the events 
“positive disparity” and “negative disparity” were equally likely under the null hypothesis 
(“ties” were again distributed evenly among the null and the alternative hypothesis). In 
fact, we found 14 subjects (about 60% of the sample) with a significant number of positive 
disparities. Five subjects exhibited only positive disparities. Thus, the conclusion may be 
drawn that the WTA-WTP disparity does not vanish when lotteries are considered instead 
of riskless commodities, even if the sign of the income effect is reversed. The occurrence 
of the disparity concentrates among a group of subjects. It would be misleading, therefore, 
to consult the results of the sign test alone in order to draw conclusion about the WTA-
WTP disparity.
This reasoning applies to Harless’ (1989) study as well, where he could not reject 
the null hypothesis of the WTA-WTP ratio being not greater than (an arbitrarily chosen 
value of) 1.1 for all lotteries and samples considered, although the median was sometimes 
even 2, and always about one half of the subjects exhibited a disparity greater than 1.1. For 
example, he presented a lottery with prize $4 and winning probability 3% to n=16 subjects 
(one outlier was deleted). The mean WTA-WTP ratio (not reported in the paper and recon-
structed from his Figure 3) was 2.25 and its standard error .484. Thus, a one-tailed t test 
would reject the null hypothesis of 2.25 being not greater than 1.1 at the 5% level. 
However, since “only” 10 of 16 subjects exhibited a WTA-WTP ratio strictly greater than 
1.1 the sign test used by Harless did not reject the null hypothesis (p=.227) because at least 
12 (p=.038) such observations had been necessary to do so. In contrast to Harless, Eisen-
berger and Weber (1995) observed a significant disparity between WTA and WTP for 
risky lotteries. In their statistical analysis they focussed on mean ratios rather than median 
ratios to derive their results. Applying Harless’ statistical analysis to their data, a binomial 
test (we chose, for example, Urn R, positive framing, see the top of Figure 1 in Eisenberger 
and Weber, 1995) yields no significant WTA—WTP disparity (that is, a disparity greater 
than 1.1): From 63 observations only 36 were strictly larger than 1.1 (p=.191), while 38 
had been necessary to reject the null hypothesis at least at the 10% level. Thus, Eisenberger 
and Weber came to the conclusion that neither moving from risk to uncertainty nor the 
framing of lotteries would matter for the size of the WTA—WTP disparity. However, ac-
cording to Harless’ much stricter criterion there had been no disparity at all. 
Summarizing, our data are despite the reversed income effect quite similar to those 
of Harless (1989) and Eisenberger and Weber (1995): the median of the WTA—WTP ratio 
13is only slightly greater than unity. Note, however, that earlier studies observed a much 
higher median of this ratio, for instance 2.85 in the study of Knetsch and Sinden (1984) 
and between 2.64 and 3.37 in the experiments of Coursey et al. (1987), see Table 1 of 
Kahneman et al. (1990) for further examples. According to Harless (1989) these higher 
medians were caused by the following differences as compared to his and our studies: (i) a 
between subject design instead of a within subject design and (ii) the lack of an incentive 
mechanism or the adoption of a riskless environment. 
Closer inspection of Table 2, reveals an interesting effect of the type of the lottery 
involved on the size of the mean or median disparity: There were 16 lotteries which guar-
anteed at least £10, for example, lotteries 4 to 6, while the other 42 non-degenerate lotteries 
contained the risk of getting a zero payoff. The WTA-WTP ratio was much larger for those 
lotteries involving zero as a possible payoff. This result was confirmed by both, standard 
two-tailed t tests on the mean difference ( 01 . £ p ) and nonparametric Mann-Whitney U 
tests ( 01 . £ p ). A trivial reason for this observation could be that on average the expected 
value of the zero-payoff lotteries was distinctly lower than for the other lotteries (17.35 as 
compared to 28.19). This should yield lower WTA and WTP for the zero-payoff lotteries 
such that identical absolute WTA-WTP differences cause larger ratios. There are, however, 
also behavioural reasons which could have caused this phenomenon. A very convincing 
hypothesis in this context is a regret effect (Bell, 1982, Loomes and Sugden, 1982; see also 
Bar-Hillel and Neter, 1996): WTP is smaller for zero-payoff lotteries because subjects fear 
to pay much for a lottery where they can end up with nothing. Our experiment was not de-
signed to test such a hypothesis. However, computing the ratios between WTA for the 42 
zero-payoff lotteries and WTA for the 16 other lotteries yields .56 while the same ratio for 
WTP is .48. This means that moving to zero-payoff lotteries WTP decreases more than 
WTA. Alternatively, subjects could have some aspiration level or target return in mind 
when evaluating the lotteries. Then, zero payoffs could be sensed as below-target returns, 
with the consequence that the valuation of zero-payoff lotteries turns out relatively low 
(see, for example, the experiments of Payne et al., 1980, 1981).
4.2 Background Risk
Recall that we analyse background risk in order to see whether the WTA-WTP disparity is 
caused by an asymmetric certainty effect. Therefore, in our test on the impact of back-
ground risk (hypothesis 2), we always start from a risky position (that is, the initial endow-
14ment is a lottery) and end up in a risky position. Some authors (for example, Jaffray, 1988, 
and Cohen, 1992) argued that a certainty effect may already be caused by different positive 
security levels among the lotteries, where the security level is the lowest possible prize of a 
lottery. In order to rule out these effects we restrict our attention to those 42 lotteries which 
involve a zero payoff. 
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 3 lists the 15 pairs of lotteries eligible as candidates. Again, some observa-
tions were excluded for not being in the interval required, or in the case  0 = DWTP  for the 
lottery which is better according to the DWTA question. Observations of the latter type 
could be prompted by the empirical observation that people are reluctant to exchange lot-
tery tickets (see Bar-Hillel and Neter, 1996). Assuming a significance level of 5%, we have 
to reject the null hypotheses in 5 of 15 cases (10 for 10% significance level) when applying 
one-tailed t tests on the mean DWTA-DWTP ratio being smaller than one. A binomial test 
rejects   the  null   hypothesis   that   this   result   is   due  to   pure   chance   ( 01 . ) 5 ( < ³ k P , 
05 . and 15 = = q n ;  01 . ) 10 ( < ³ k P ,  10 . and 15 = = q n ). Again, most of the distributions 
of DWTA-DWTP ratios are highly skewed and, therefore, it seems more appropriate to ap-
ply nonparametric tests. The respective test on the median being smaller than one (ties are 
distributed evenly) rejects the null hypothesis for only 1 of the lottery pairs considered at 
the 5% significance level and for 2 at the 10% significance level, respectively. A global 
test does not reject the null hypothesis that this pattern is due to pure chance (
537 . ) 1 ( = ³ k P , 05 . and 15 = = q n ;  451 . ) 2 ( = ³ k P , 10 . and 15 = = q n ). 
Note that in eleven of 15 cases the median is exactly one. The global median is one 
too while it equals 1.058 for the standard WTA-WTP ratio. Accordingly, we expect the 
disparity to be reduced when differential measures are applied instead of the standard 
measures (hypothesis 3). Indeed, the Mann-Whitney U test rejects the null hypothesis of 
the distributions of the medians in Tables 2 (WTA-WTP ratios) and 3 (DWTA-DWTP ra-
tios) coming from the same population: the DWTA-DWTP ratio is significantly smaller 
than the WTA-WTP ratio (n=73, U=263, p=.016).  
4.3 Cash Equivalents
In this section we want to investigate whether WTA and CE are indeed equivalent meas-
ures as predicted by EU. The right side of Table 2 shows the results from testing equation 
(15). Again, n denotes the number of valid observations per lottery. An observed CE was 
15treated as valid if it did not exceed the maximum payoff of the lottery and if it did not fall 
below its minimum payoff. The next columns list the means (first row) and standard errors 
(second row), and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z statistic for the test on normality. Finally, 
the last column gives the median, and 90% confidence intervals for the median (note that 
hypothesis 4 requires a two-tailed test).
As can be taken from the table, in most cases we could not reject the null hypothes-
is of the WTA-CE ratio being equal to one. This applies to both, the t test and the median 
test. If at all, there seems to be a slight tendency of the CE measure towards being slightly 
larger than the WTA measure (the median WTA-CE ratio over all lotteries is. 953 for the 
means and .996 for the medians). As to the t test, in 12 the ratio was significantly smaller 
than one as compared to one test only being larger than one. A similar picture arose from 
the nonparametric test. Thus, it seems to be irrelevant for CVM studies whether WTA or 
CE is employed. However, it should be mentioned that this result has to be taken with 
some caution since we used different incentive mechanisms in both cases (second-price 
auction for WTA and BDM mechanism for CE). In principle, it may be the case that WTA 
is indeed larger then CE but, at the same time, second-price auctions yield lower values 
than the BDM mechanism such that both effects cancel out each other. We are not aware 
of experimental studies comparing the BDM mechanism with second-price auctions dir-
ectly. Yet, Harless (1989) using second-price auctions and Eisenberger and Weber (1995) 
using the BDM mechanism elicited rather similar data since the differences between the 
results of both papers were simply due to the application of different statistical tests. Con-
sequently, it seems to be rather unlikely that the equivalence between WTA and CE in our 
experiment is due to the use of different incentive mechanisms.
Our result is in contrast to the results of Kahneman et al. (1990) who observed a 
median WTA-CE ratio exceeding two. There are, however, at least two important differ-
ences to our experimental design: a between subject design instead of a within subject 
design and the adoption of a riskless environment.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the disparity between WTA and WTP for risky lotteries. A 
central feature of our experimental design was the reversal of the income effect. More pre-
cisely, when eliciting WTP subjects were placed in a higher wealth position than in the eli-
citation of WTA. If the income effect had caused the disparity in previous studies, WTP 
should have exceeded WTA in our experiment. Since, nevertheless, our results do not sub-
16stantially differ from those obtained before, for example, by Harless (1989) and Eisenber-
ger and Weber (1995), we are inclined to conclude that the income effect is not capable of 
explaining the disparity. It is important to note, however, that the disparity concentrated 
among a subsample of 14 subjects (about 60% of the sample). This explains the contradict-
ory results gained from parametric and nonparametric tests. Our results suggest that the in-
come effect is small and that the WTP is sufficient to compensate losses in CVM studies.
Similar to our study, Harless (1989) and Eisenberger and Weber (1995) obtained 
median WTA-WTP ratios close to one while other studies like Knetsch and Sinden (1984) 
observed median WTA-WTP ratios exceeding two. Harless (1989) attributed this differ-
ence to three possible reasons: a riskless framework, a between subject design, and/or the 
lack of an incentive mechanism. Though our results on background risk seem to indicate 
that risk is the main reason for the reduced WTA-WTP disparity in the present study as 
well as in the work of Harless (1989) and Eisenberger and Weber (1995), we still cannot 
single out other sources. In order to answer this question a within subjects study would be 
needed in which every subject evaluates riskless and risky commodities in an incentive 
compatible way. Should our conjecture as to the role of risk for the WTA-WTP disparity 
become a certainty, the debate on the right measure to assess the value of commodities 
would become less relevant since many typical questions taken up by contingent valuation 
are concerned with the assessment of risky situations (health risks, automobile and nuclear 
plant safety, disasters, etc.). Our results on the equivalence of CE and WTA under risk re-
inforce this conclusion. 
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17Appendix
Instructions to Treatment 1
Introduction
Recall that you have to make decisions with respect to 60 lotteries in all of the five occasions. At the end of the 
experiment we will randomly select one question from one of the five occasions and play it out for real. In this 
occasion you have to answer exactly one question for every single lottery out of the 60 lotteries.
What are the questions?
In this occasion the lotteries are auctioned by a second-price sealed-bid auction. Sealed-bid means that every 
bidder submits her/his bid secretly, i.e. you do not know the bids of the other bidders and the other bidders do not 
know your bid. Second-price means that the bidder with the highest bid receives the auctioned lottery and has to 
pay a price which equals precisely the second highest bid. In other words, if you have the highest bid among all 
bidders you do not have to pay your own bid but only  the second highest bid in order to receive the lottery. In 
this occasion a lottery appears on the screen and you are asked: ”Submit your bid for this lottery in a second-price 
sealed-bid auction”.
How is your reward calculated? 
If a question of this occasion is selected for your reward you first receive a constant payment of £y, where y is the 
highest possible prize of the lottery, which is involved in this question. Moreover, if you are the subject with the 
highest bid among all subjects in the group you completed this occasion, you receive the corresponding lottery 
and have to pay the second highest bid.
How should you determine your bid?
Obviously the price you are at most willing to pay for a given lottery just depends on your own preferences, it 
cannot be objectively ”right” or ”wrong”. However, given the price you are personally at most willing to pay for 
a given lottery it is in your own interest to submit exactly this price as bid for the lottery. In the following we 
want to explain you why this is true.
Note that your bid has no influence on the price you pay for the lottery, it just decides whether you will 
receive the lottery for a given price or not. Suppose the price you are at most willing to pay for the given lottery is 
for example £31.04. Then you should bid, as we show you in the sequel, also £31.04. Suppose you ,would bid a 
lower amount, say, £23.91. If the highest bid among all other bidders is higher than £31.04, you would not 
receive the lottery in both cases. If the highest bid among the other bidders is lower than £23.91, for example 
£17.56, you would receive the lottery for a payment of £17.56 in both cases. Now suppose the highest bid among 
all other bidders is £25.53. If you bid £23.91, you do not receive the lottery. However, if you bid your true 
willingness to pay, i.e. £31.04, you will receive the lottery for the price of £25.53, which is significantly lower 
than the maximal price you are willing to pay. Therefore, you cannot win by bidding an amount lower than the 
price you are at most willing to pay. Now suppose you submit a bid higher than £31.04, for example £37.89. If 
the highest bid among all other bidders is higher than £37.89 or lower than £31.04, this does not change anything. 
But suppose the highest bid among all other bidders is £36.14. If you have submitted your true maximal buying 
18price as bid, you would not receive the lottery in this case. If you, however, have submitted £37.89 as bid, you 
receive the lottery but have to pay £36.14, which is strictly higher than the price you are at most willing to pay. 
Consequently, you can also not win by bidding an amount higher than the price you are at most willing to pay.   
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23Table 1 The lottery pairs
probability of payoff probability of payoff
# £0 £10 £30 £40 # £0 £10 £30 £40
lotteries
1 --- --- 1.00 --- 31 .20 --- --- .80
2 .75 --- .25 --- 32 .80 --- --- .20
3 .30 .60 .10 --- 33 .32 .60 --- .08
4 --- .60 .10 .30 34 .02 .60 --- .38
5 --- 1.00 --- --- 35 .70 --- --- .30
6 --- .50 .50 --- 36 .35 --- .50 .15
7 .50 .50 --- --- 37 .85 --- --- .15
8 --- --- .70 .30 38 .15 --- --- .85
9 .80 --- .14 .06 39 .83 --- --- .17
10 .20 --- .74 .06 40 .23 --- .60 .17
11 --- .20 .80 --- 41 --- .50 --- .50
12 .50 .10 .40 --- 42 .50 .25 --- .25
13 --- .20 .60 .20 43 .20 --- .40 .40
14 --- .10 .30 .60 44 .10 --- .20 .70
15 .20 .80 --- --- 45 .80 --- --- .20
16 .10 .40 .50 --- 46 .40 --- .50 .10
17 --- .40 .60 --- 47 .40 --- --- .60
18 .50 .20 .30 --- 48 .70 --- --- .30
19 --- .20 .30 .50 49 .20 --- --- .80
20 --- .20 .70 .10 50 .20 --- .40 .40
21 --- --- .50 .50 51 .10 --- --- .90
22 .50 --- .50 --- 52 .60 --- --- .40
23 .25 .50 .25 --- 53 .30 .50 --- .20
24 --- .50 --- .50 54 .20 .20 --- .60
25 .50 .25 --- .25 55 .60 .10 --- .30
26 --- .25 .50 .25 56 --- .35 --- .65
27 --- --- .75 .25 57 --- .10 .25 .65
28 .25 .25 .50 --- 58 .25 .35 --- .40
30 
balls
60 balls 30 
balls
60 balls
# red black yellow # red  black yellow
uncertain lotteries
29 £30 £0 £0 59 £0 £30 £0
30 £30 £0 £30 60 £0 £30 £30
24Table 2 Testing on income effects and the equivalence of cash equivalents (CE) with will-
ingness-to-accept (WTA)













































































































































































25continuation of Table 2





















































































































































































26continuation of Table 2




















































































































































Median 22 1.876 --- 1.058 22 .953 --- .996
Table note.  10 . * £ p .  05 . * * £ p . n denotes the number of valid observations. t tests are one-
tailed for WTA vs. WTP and two-tailed for CE vs. WTA. KS-Z is the value of the Z statistic of 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on normality. k is the number of valid observations (WTA-WTP 
ratios) exceeding 1 (including half of the ties). CI is the 90% confidence interval for the median 
of the WTA-CE ratios.
27Table 3 Testing on background risk


































































Median 17 1.867 --- 1.000
Table note.   10 . * £ p .   05 . * * £ p .  n  denotes the 
number of valid observations. t test: two-tailed. KS-
Z is the value of the Z statistic of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on normality. k is the number of valid 
observations  (DWTA-DWTP   ratios)   exceeding  1 
(including half of the ties).
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£10       50%